

**00829**

**1962/10/27**

NLK NSF CUBA

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON D. C.



221

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY Attachments~~

CWT-1/16/1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

442

October 28, 1962  
10:40 a.m.

IV

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: October 27 Paper on  
Negotiations

Attached for the use of the Executive  
Committee are copies of an October 27 paper  
on "Negotiations" done by the Rostow  
Subcommittee.

distinger 11/9/62  
(ys) 15, 16, 17.  
19-35

*wk for*  
William H. Brueck  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.  
Copies: 14-17 &  
19-35.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY Attachments~~

406/2

October 27, 1962

14

## MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NSC

SUBJECT: Negotiations

EYES ONLY

1. Khrushchev's letter is more likely, in our view, to reflect a decision to disengage from offensive weapons in Cuba, saving as much face as possible, than to represent a tactical maneuver or gimmick.

2. In a larger sense, this decision might portend a major shift in Soviet policy. A few months ago we had said that Khrushchev was reaching a point in his post-Sputnik offensive where, if he could not score an early success, he would probably seek some relief from the pressures which that offensive had placed on him. We had anticipated that he might seek such a success in either Cuba, Berlin, or weapons development. We had also anticipated that, if we stood firm and denied him that success, the chances would be increased of his seeking relief from these pressures through relaxation.

3. Against this background, our posture in the present crisis should be designed to:

(a) make clear that the Cuban issue must be settled by the prompt elimination of Soviet offensive weapons, and without any offsetting concessions other than pure atmospherics, e.g., a Latin American nuclear-free zone;

(b) make equally clear that we are prepared to undertake immediate negotiations with the USSR on arms control and other issues, that we are ready to go to a Summit on these matters as soon as Cuba is out of the way, and that we would be willing to concert now about the specific items to be taken up at a Summit - even while Cuba was being got out of the way.

4. A memorandum is attached which outlines the approach that might be made to a Summit meeting under the strategy discussed above. Its substantive treatment of the issues to be taken up at a Summit is the same as that contained in the October 26 paper on "Negotiations" which was co-ordinated with the interested regional Bureaus and ACDA.

W. W. Rostow

RECORDED  
EO 141762, Sec. 2(e) and 5(d)  
State NLK-75-123  
By MCD Date 10/15/76

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